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SIS

A CRITICAL INTERPRETATION OF

MODERN LOGIC

SUBMITTED IN COMPETITION FOR

THE KENAN FELLOWSHIP

APRIL 7, 1934

CONVERE JONES BURWELL

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PREFATORY NOTE

This paper has grown so directly from the content and process of Horace Williams' Modern Logic that I have in places reproduced even his phraseology. The material is almost exclusively from Williams' book, and I shall not deem it necessary to footnote the innumerable passages that contain his ideas, nor to inclose in quotation marks his phrases. This paper is entirely my own interpretation, criticism, and appreciation of Williams' book. To the author, I am indebted for an exceedingly thought-provoking study. To the stimulation of Modern Logic, I attribute what worth these pages may have.

THE ZEPHYRUS

This paper was first published in 1891 and has since
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Horace Williams is an eminent logician of today; in his books, The Evolution of Logic and Modern Logic, he follows the idealistic tradition; in his methods and his ideas, he is a disciple of Hegel. He presents Hegelian logic in the terms of twentieth century experience; the real object of logic is to glean reality from experience. In order to fulfill this object, Williams presents life in terms of Hegelian logic - in terms of modern thought. The method is adapted to this progressive civilization; it exhibits the movement, the process which is typical of life today. Expressed in Modern Logic and interpreted in everyday experience and in the history of thought, this Hegelian system is pertinent to modern civilization.

The reality of Horace Williams' Modern Logic is in the process. The value of this reality is its meaning for life. The reality is in process and it cannot be exhibited in summary nor by quotation; it can be found only through thinking - through relating the quality and the quantity of the process into absolute synthesis - into the unity that is in structure difference - the truth. Truth may not be glimpsed from Williams' pages; it comes only through the individual thinking process; it comes only through synthesis in the individual mind. (1) It is only by practice in reflecting that we may become reflective, and it is only by practice in logic that we may become logical. Thinking is the basis of the process which is aufgehoben, which by necessity exhibits unity. Does this book make us think? Does it stimulate that process that supplies its own raw material and consumes its own children? It does. Modern Logic may instigate the process of the real individual. Thinking is the grund of all life, and the object of life is to see reality as the self - to see the self as the process. Thinking is, therefore, the grund of that process by which the self is realized. The test of intelligence is life, and the test of this book which exhibits the process of intelligence is its meaning for life.

(1) Columbia Associates in Philosophy, An Introduction to Reflective Thinking, New York, 1923, p 324

It is not alone what Williams says, nor how he says it, nor why; it is the totality of the process - the reality of relation of the form and the content that is worthwhile. He exhibits, in the book, a plan for living - a plan that is begun, continued, and ended in thinking. The individual must find himself as spirit through thinking, in thinking, and of thinking. He must transcend himself, as self, in exhibiting the universal, and yet must maintain his individuality.

What is it within the book that serves as an impetus for self realization, for finding a plan for living? It is not merely what the book says; it is rather what it arouses - thought. How does this book arouse thought - that action of the mind which once in process within the finite mind, by its very nature, seeks the infinite? How can individuality transcend itself and yet maintain its identity within its self? This is the problem of living - that problem that has animated the thinking of Anaxagoras, of the Eleatics, of Socrates, of Kant, of Hegel, of Bergson, of Williams - the problem that is constantly pricking great minds today. What does this book do to help solve the problem? It seeks to make us see life in terms of logic by exhibiting logic in terms of life. What can this process make of the individual? Can it create the individual who can solve the problem of living? It may create a thinker - a unit of civilization, an individual of principle, an individual of spirit. The process begins and ends in absolute thought.

If one is to find himself within the process, he must liken himself - his life - to the process; he must feel his life process aufgehoben, must realize the reality of relation - he must feel the necessity of making the standards of the process his own. If I, as an individual, find myself thinking in the process of Williams' book and develop into a creative unit, I shall realize my own necessity, power, and possibility as relation. I shall as a unit be both möglichkeit and wirklichkeit; I shall be maintaining my identity under all circumstances, be an individual of character. It at the same time, I lose

myself in the process, I shall be a conscious unit of loyalty and service to some cause. I shall exhibit reality through the truth of relation. As a unit of truth - an ultimate unit of life, I must exhibit the universal in living. I must be the particular between the individual as subjective and the individual as universal - and in this relation as active I must express a threefold activity of knowing, loving, and doing. In expressing this threefold activity, I am an individual of spirit, of religion, of love. As an individual in love, I may transcend myself as self and respond to the absolute synthesis of the universal and absolute. If I do so, I find the answer to the problem of living. It is found through thinking - found to be of thinking and found as the thesis for thinking. "Cogito ergo sum!" If this Cartesian phrase is interpreted in the Hegelian sense, it must mean, "I think, therefore I am becoming." It is then expressive of the realization process. As an individual, I may realize myself in the process of Hegelian logic, if I liken life to this process.

If the individual finds himself in the life process, he must see life as a whole in the process of being aufgehoben; he must scrutinize carefully the process aufgehoben, must comprehend and feel its complete concreteness and must differentiate quality from quantity. Most important of all, he must value the power of relation, he must feel its dynamic quality which is its true worth. Life is by nature dialectical; it is structurally contradictory. Without recognition of the begriff, it is a limp, abstract process that falls apart; with recognition of the begriff, it is a concrete, absorbing, creating, uplifting, integrating process - an organic unity that has its ultimate reality in difference. It is only through recognition of the power of relation in the begriff that life has power and value. There is no aspect of Williams' logic which I found so vital as dynamic relation. It is the coercive, attractive, absorbing category that perpetuates the system.

Is the individual real? Is the universal real? Neither without the particular. The reality of the universal lies in its expression through the

individual; the reality of the individual is the manifestation of the universal. The individual is real as character through identity in difference - through maintaining identity of self as a mean between the subjective and the universal. As the individual is able to maintain his identity, he sees himself in terms of ultimate reality. This is ambition - the challenge of the above self to the self, the striving of the finite to become infinite. The individual, through dynamic relations, feels himself in and of the process; the power is möglichkeit and he ever strives upward. The dynamic individual is a creative unit that can accept no limits. He is reality as relation; and this relation is world-wide. As the individual becomes conscious of the presence of this reality, this relation in his experience, he is religious. Religion is a deepening process - the cause and effect - the source of deeper consciousness of the vital power of reality. One who is within his religious experience, finds this reality and possesses faith, as Paul termed it. The individual is now an ultimate unit of reality - the source of institutions. Consciousness of this reality of the self, becomes the steady purpose of history. Civilization, rooted and grounded in the institution, is conscious of itself, its history. History has its existence in the individual of spirit. Spirit is the culmination of the process - it is reality absolute.- it is the source of activity - the power within itself to complete and stimulate itself. And how has the individual become spirit? Through the reality of relation and that reality of relation is the particular. It is in this sense that the reality of the individual and of the universal depends upon the particular. Intelligence is latent; in its expression through the individual and universal in relation, it is kinetic. Life in each moment of the process is relation. Without the negative of every positive, there could be no reality. Without the synthesizing process of life there could be no dialectic; without the struggle there could be no process in which the individual seeks to solve the problem of living. Without the outcome of the dialectic in the individual of spirit, there could be no

The first of these is the fact that the world is not a uniform whole, but a collection of many different parts, each of which has its own characteristics and its own laws. This is the principle of diversity, and it is the basis of all knowledge. The second is the fact that the world is not a static whole, but a dynamic whole, in which everything is constantly changing and moving. This is the principle of change, and it is the basis of all action. The third is the fact that the world is not a simple whole, but a complex whole, in which everything is interconnected and interdependent. This is the principle of unity, and it is the basis of all harmony. The fourth is the fact that the world is not a perfect whole, but an imperfect whole, in which everything is subject to error and failure. This is the principle of imperfection, and it is the basis of all improvement. The fifth is the fact that the world is not a finite whole, but an infinite whole, in which everything is part of a larger whole. This is the principle of infinity, and it is the basis of all expansion. The sixth is the fact that the world is not a separate whole, but a connected whole, in which everything is part of a larger whole. This is the principle of connection, and it is the basis of all unity. The seventh is the fact that the world is not a static whole, but a dynamic whole, in which everything is constantly changing and moving. This is the principle of change, and it is the basis of all action. The eighth is the fact that the world is not a simple whole, but a complex whole, in which everything is interconnected and interdependent. This is the principle of unity, and it is the basis of all harmony. The ninth is the fact that the world is not a perfect whole, but an imperfect whole, in which everything is subject to error and failure. This is the principle of imperfection, and it is the basis of all improvement. The tenth is the fact that the world is not a finite whole, but an infinite whole, in which everything is part of a larger whole. This is the principle of infinity, and it is the basis of all expansion.

ultimate unit of reality - no individual to be related to the universal.

Without relation there is no knowledge - no institution - no faith - no civilization. Without relation there is no reality of life.

Theoretically, it is true that relation is the heart of the organic structure of life. Practically, is relation so essential a part of the process as it is a part of the logic of Williams' book? Quite as essential! The individual as individual has no reality within himself; it is only as a part of the unity, as the one in relation to the many, that he has power. Does the monastic hermit exert as pervading an influence as the social welfare worker? Does the man without a party provide as much competition for the Democrats as the leader of the Republicans? Indeed no; in every walk of life, power is the effect and the cause of relation. Williams' logic of philosophy, of the particular, and of relation, all issues in the individual as the ultimate reality. Therefore, the logical process exhibiting life grounded in the process of the particular, is of the utmost significance as a guide for the individual, as a plan for living. All life is absorbed into and created into the logic of Christianity, for religion is grounded in the ultimate I, which is in turn grounded in the begriff. Christianity is the synthetic process which the real I manifests, the I which could not be real without relation, for the process of relation is a process of self-realization.

It is difficult to speak of the method of Williams' Modern Logic - it is the reality, and has its truth in the unity of structure difference. The form and content have no reality when they are separated; the system is valuable within itself. It is a natural system which follows the life process; the value lies in the content and in the form, as the active principle. There is no emphasis upon the structure of the process. It is real and by necessity exhibits itself as the ideas are unfolded within the material. The process has its reality within its other - in einem Anderem. The material has its reality in the process. There is a reciprocal relation, as each finds its being in its other.

The intensity has its reality in the extensity. The quality finds expression in the extent denoted.

In contrast is formal logic. This is a forced process - an artificial structure superimposed upon the material - a structure so designed as to coerce facts into an intelligible form. The form does not proceed from the nature of the content; there is no power of the reality of relation which of necessity demands synthesis of structure difference into truth. Aristotelian logic loses the reality of relation; for instance, the two terms intension and extension are discussed in H.B. Joseph's An Introduction to Logic.⁽¹⁾ They are defined clearly and accurately; but they are isolated from each other in the interpretation which formal logic gives; the meaning of one is not contingent upon the meaning of the other. The system does not provide that one division of the logic should find its being within another. Letters as symbols are used to represent variants in quality, quantity, modality and relation. The result is a system of insulated parts. The phenomena which these letters represent could hardly be so insulated from one another as the letters indicate. The material of logic is what thinking has already accomplished; therefore, it is particularly significant that Hegelian logic should find itself within the history of thought - should be concretely expressed in the story of philosophy. Formal logic permits that das Anders, in which is found the reality of the system be subducted from the system. Examples are given to clarify the intricacies and to exhibit the use of the terms; otherwise, material of thought has no essential role in Aristotelian logic. It is the problem of logic to show the interrelation of all stages of intelligence, to regard thought as organic and to see no step as complete without its other.⁽²⁾ It would be difficult to justify this problem in formal logic. The

(1) Joseph, H.W.B., An Introduction to Logic, Oxford, 1916 pp 136-158

(2) Creighton, J.E. An Introductory Logic, London, 1930 p 34

It is interesting to note that Creighton was an ardent Hegelian. In this book, however, he presents Aristotelian logic. He considered the formal process exceedingly valuable for mental discipline and for testing knowledge; but he realized that the Hegelian process was of greater worth for individual realization.

procedure of applying the system to a problem is artificial and stereotyped; it in no way realizes the dynamic qualities of material nor of the process. J.E. Creighton in An Introductory to Logic termed thinking a process of conservation as well as of transformation - implying that formal logic demands that the entire case be stated within the major and minor premises and that it be restated in the conclusion; Hegelian logic would, in an analogous statement, term thinking a process of absorption as well as of creation. Truth is not the natural outcome of the formal process; it is the end in view - not the cause and effect. Aristotelian logic stresses the form and substitutes the categories of thought for the reality of the process - a substitution of quantity for quality. When one is substituted for the other, the dynamic power of both disappears. The conclusion is of premier importance in formal logic. It is not a genetic process; within the system, the conclusion is final. Dynamic relation is of premier importance in Hegelian logic. It is a genetic system; and each particular, as the reality of relation, forms a new thesis. There is no finality in the Hegelian process.

The very nature of Modern Logic holds implicitly Williams' logical system. The dialectic is exhibited - not explained - the struggle is self-evident and necessary, in his development of the concept of the individual, of the particular, and of the universal. The true meaning of synthesis is found in its power to surmount contradictions, surmounting them through absorbing them. The Hegelian triad has value as it exhibits the dialectic. The integrations and inner relations exhibit their own character. The reality is a growing process, growing through relation in the mind, which is of the process and moving in the process. The process which is aufgehoben is true because it is necessary - the process can nowhere be ended, for thinking by nature supplies its own raw material of each new thesis and consumes these theses into new syntheses. The book, as it exhibits the process of life, contains the command "go forward". It has no value, no reality in part, except as some part may show the dialectic. Its worth lies in its completeness as a guide for life. If I should wish to build a bridge

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from a mechano set, and should read only part of the instructions, I, perhaps, would select the correct materials, but would I relate them properly? Could I construct a true bridge in which the pieces were vitally related to the entire structure? No, the book ever urging forward has no meaning if we cut short the process, if we break off before we find ourselves in and of the process. In each step, one feels the nature of the process which is aufgehoben. One gains understanding through feeling. There is a vivid example of the character of the triad in Williams' discussion of the logic of Paul, Origen and Athanasius. Paul revealed the reality of the individual through faith - quality. Origen quantitated this quality, finding the reality in thinking; Athanasius found the synthesis - the spirit - the begriff - the power of relation, the reality of the dynamic, in the expression of quality in quantity and quantity in quality. This process is typical of the progress of thought. This triad is but one moment in the onward march; and on and on it goes, for "truth is inhibiting to intelligence". Intelligence will not allow itself to be inhibited by truth - it is by nature constantly going forward, upward, outward. In the words of Hegel, truth is by nature progressively realizing the reign of God.

Intelligence, in its onward march, seems blocked by the structure of our own sensory processes, for the senses report perception; and material perception is reality. Why is intelligence not blocked? Because thinking exhibits the dialectic the struggle of life, because thinking reveals contradiction as the basis of life. There can be no meaning in thinking if there is not the contradiction of the senses.

Williams has shown the process not only as illustrative of the progress of thought - not only as indicative of the necessary movement of thought within the process, but also significant in the dialectic quality of life. For example, the ancient Greeks began with the problem of unity, Thales grasped that fundamental conception. Each thinker that followed Thales has contributed some new phase of philosophy - generally conceived through antagonism to extant ideas or formulated as a conscious effort to reconcile conflicting ideas. Empedocles sought to hold on

From a methodological point of view, the study of the history of the philosophy of science is not a purely historical task. It is a task which requires a deep understanding of the scientific method and of the philosophical foundations of science. The study of the history of the philosophy of science is not a purely historical task. It is a task which requires a deep understanding of the scientific method and of the philosophical foundations of science.

to both the permanence of the Eleatics and the change of Heraclitus; he absorbed these contradictory ideas and set forth a new conception. It is significant that Williams has revealed the process of thought through the process of thought. The ultimate dialectic of the process lies in the fact that the senses report variety and thinking reports unity; it is the problem that faced Thales; it is the problem that faces us. It can be solved only through thought; if it were not so, there could be no absolute process.

The philosophy of Williams exhibits the process which is aufgehoben and it reminds one of that idea of Heraclitus that "reality is a process, a becoming." One may envisage his kinship with Spinoza. How like unto his "sub specie aeternitatis" is Williams' idea that the dogma of immortality is an effort to recognize the transcendent quality of the individual as reality. Williams' statement that love is the existence of the universal in the individual carries us back to Spinoza's "amor intellectualis dei". For Williams, the final expression of reality is beauty; the idea is closely akin to Plato's and also to Hegel's. If the individual is to find the ultimate value in the unity in action difference - the law, then he must, in keeping the law, transcend it. Is this not a Kantian and a Christian idea? The material of Williams' Modern Logic illustrates the process - the very process which he is expounding.

The style of the author is peculiar to him - difficult indeed - intricate and at first confusing; but the more stimulating because it stings to thought. Williams uses cryptic, epigrammatic statements; he explains little. It is left to the individual mind to find the reality - the truth through relating. Therein lies the value of the style. It instigates the truth-seeking process of the individual. The unity of Modern Logic is in the difference of the parts. Each discussion has its relation to another. The reality of relation is the compass from which the reader takes his bearings; it is the lighthouse on the dangerous shore. The first reading yields little of the content of Modern Logic; gradually, as the mind stretches farther and farther, the material begins to take form as a

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whole. The book first has meaning, not in part, but as a unit, because Williams has revealed in the transitions their dynamic and necessary structure, Through analysis, one may comprehend particular facts - but as isolated from the organic unity, the parts have no truth. The synthesis is supreme and absorbing - the struggling mind that wrestles with Williams must possess the essentially synthetic approach to gain understanding. Synthesis that is relation and creation through transitions of the dynamic quality is all important. Analysis is secondary but necessary within the synthesis. It would be difficult for one uninitiated in the ways of the Hegelian process to comprehend and feel the value of Williams' Modern Logic. Certainly, a knowledge of Hegel is enlightening and revealing to a reader of this book.

The real merit of Williams' method lies in the fact that his logic cannot be superimposed upon a mind and still retain its value. It must be mastered, tested, and found real and true to life by the individual mind, where it has any meaning for that mind. If the individual finds the process valid and can identify himself with the process, he becomes an individual of principle, finds himself in and of the absolute process of reality. It is then that the method of Williams, exhibiting the nature of the process of life has true significance and worth. It becomes a guide for life. The book, interpreting Hegelian logic, is worthy of its purpose - to exhibit the true meaning of life.

Within the process of Williams' discussion, one section seems out of place with relation to the whole. Why is the section on propositions arranged unequal propositions, organic propositions, and then dynamic propositions? Is the dynamic proposition not an unequal proposition? Are not both on the level of the begriff, recognizing the structure? Are not both propositions which are based on relation? Assuming that both are seeking the relation of the individual and the universal, why should not the dynamic proposition be discussed prior to the organic proposition? The organic expresses the structure of the fact in terms

... the first of these, but it is not, as a rule, ...

... the second of these, but it is not, as a rule, ...

... the third of these, but it is not, as a rule, ...

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... the thirtieth of these, but it is not, as a rule, ...

of principle, and the absolute which comes through the organic is the concrete. Was the organic proposition placed after the proposition of identity, after the unequal proposition, and before the propositions of perception and the dynamic propositions in order to show the relation of the two groups; namely, the propositions of identity, unequal propositions, organic propositions on the one hand, and on the other, the propositions of perception, dynamic propositions and organic propositions? It is characteristic of the system that the propositions recognizing the category of relation should precede the presentation of the proposition instituted by the proposition of relation. In view of the form and content of Modern Logic, is Williams justified in arranging the propositions in this order? The process cannot permit such an inconsistency in its necessarily logical structure. Neither can it permit that the discussion of the ultimate judgment precede the discussion of the other levels of judgment out of which grows the ultimate judgment. Truth is unity in structure difference; and as truth, the ultimate judgment cannot be logically true until the difference exhibits itself as unity. In this instance Williams seems to proceed in a reverse direction. It is a counter evolutionary movement and it is not characteristic of modern logic.

And what of the individual judgment? Is there not a judgment on the level of sein and dasein? Is there not a judgment on this level which expresses recognition? Without a judgment of the individual, the value of the particular as relation is lost. The particular cannot, without the individual judgment, be cause and effect. There is no necessity - no power - no ekklasia within the particular, for it is not the reality of relation. Williams' discussion of the judgments is not consistent with the process in which truth is reality as relation. In omitting the individual judgment, Williams fails to attach his chain of thinking to a thesis. Does he not omit the thesis? Because the thesis is omitted and because the synthesis precedes the steps that procreate the synthesis, the process of judgments does not seem by nature aufgehoben. His discussion of the judgments is not convincing. Why? Because the reality of relation is not exhibited.

Perhaps it is not lost, but certainly it is not exhibited within the process of the judgments. Aristotle would tolerate the placing of the ultimate^{judgment}/first. Hegel would not, without sufficient reason. Is the author portraying the Aristotelian conception of judgment or his own conception of judgment? Perhaps the explanation is in the former.

The reality of relation must be exhibited; it is the very grund of the process - the cause and effect of the reality of Williams' book. It is essential that one does not lose the force of the process; therefore, the moments which have been discussed and questioned, if they are to be vital, must be within the process itself in such a way that they reveal the dynamic relation of reality. Without the reality of relation, the process loses power, the individual loses power - life loses power. How can the individual maintain himself and transcend himself? How can he find reality? As an ultimate unit, how can he identify himself with reality? How can man, as an individual, become part of the universal? Through relation. All may be accomplished through love - that is through exhibiting the process of relation and synthesis in living. "Love is the absolute synthesis - the consciousness of the individual that he is in and of the cosmic process."⁽¹⁾ Williams exhibits the process; shall we live the process? The test of intelligence is life. Intelligence is ultimate. Philosophy stands at the beginning and at the end of the process; it is both the starter and the goal. Intelligence is the ground-work - the grund of all life. Shall we through our intelligence exhibit the process? Shall we through relating our intelligence to the absolute become ultimate? It is again the problem of living. The reality of Horace Williams' Modern Logic is in the process; all reality is in process. The value of this reality is in its meaning for life; it is a plan for living. Why? The book has the highest value as a guide to life, as a method of interpreting life, as a means by which the individual, by losing himself, may find himself an und für sich in the absolute. When the individual loses himself in Modern Logic, he finds himself as dynamic relation within the process; and in thus

(1) Williams, H.H. Modern Logic, Durham, N.C. 1927, p. 333

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losing himself, he transcends himself, but in transcending himself he never gets beyond the limits of the process of Modern Logic, because the book has no limits. As a guide to life, it eternally reveals itself in every phase of living. It instigates within the individual the process of self-realization which is aufgehoben - that process by which the individual may build a life of which the parts are organically related and necessary to the entire structure. When one finds himself within the process, the book has true meaning, life has true worth. Does Modern Logic not stimulate a plan for living, urging ever onward, upward, and outward, insisting that "we see life steadily and see it whole"?

we will spend all summer (that's right) in London with my friend and family.

